Competition in Large Markets by Jeffrey R. Campbell
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES








Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and NBER. I am grateful to Gadi Barlevy, Meredith Crowley, and Ruilin
Zhou for their helpful comments. The National Science Foundation supported my research on this topic
through grant SBR-0137048 to the NBER. Please address correspondence to Jeffrey Campbell, Economic
Research,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Chicago,  230  South  LaSalle  St.,  Chicago,  IL  60604.  e-mail:
jcampbell@frbchi.org The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
©2005 by Jeffrey R. Campbell.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may
be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Competition in Large Markets
Jeffrey R. Campbell
NBER Working Paper No. 11847
December 2005, Revised July 2006
JEL No. L11, L81
ABSTRACT
This paper develops a simple and robust implication of free entry followed by competition without
substantial strategic interactions: Increasing the number of consumers leaves the distributions of
producers' prices and other choices unchanged. In many models featuring non-trivial strategic
considerations, producers' prices fall as their numbers increase. Hence, examining the relationship
between  market  size  and  producers'  actions  provides  a  nonparametric  tool  for  empirically
discriminating between these distinct approaches to competition. To illustrate its application, I
examine observations of restaurants' seating capacities, exit decisions, and prices from 224 U.S.
cities. Given factor prices and demographic variables, increasing a city's size increases restaurants'
capacities, decreases their exit rate, and decreases their prices. These results suggest that strategic
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Observations of producers’ actions from ﬁrm registries or national statistical agencies typ-
ically lack an accompanying description of their strategic environments. This unfortunate
fact tempts one to assume that producers compete anonymously in a large market, but ca-
sual observation nearly always suggests some scope for strategic interaction between ﬁrms.
This paper places this informal suspicion on a replicable basis using nonparametric regres-
sions of producers’ choices on market size. The data come from 222 U.S. cities’ restaurant
industries and are reported in the 1992 Census of Retail Trade. Under the null hypothesis
of atomistic competition, market size has no impact on these decisions. This restriction is
familiar from highly stylized models of monopolistic and perfect competition, and this paper
proves it in a very general model without substantial restrictions on the market demand sys-
tem, producers’ cost functions, or the variables over which they compete. Even if one ﬁnds
atomistic competition implausible ex ante, the nonparametric regression indicates which ob-
servable choices are particularly inﬂuenced by the strategic environment. The results show
that restaurants do not compete atomistically. Instead, strategic considerations apparently
shape ﬁrms’ prices, exit decisions, and sizes.
In the simplest model of long-run perfect competition, free-entry requires all producers
to minimize average cost regardless of the scale or shape of the market demand curve.
In Dixit and Stiglitz’s (1977) model of Chamberlinian monopolistic competition, the free
entry condition implies that each ﬁrm’s sales equals the product of the exogenous ﬁxed cost
with consumers’ constant elasticity of demand. Doubling the number of consumers leaves
producers’ average sales unchanged. I show that the invariance of producer decisions to
market size is much more general than these examples suggest, so it can provide the basis
for empirically detecting strategic interactions and measuring their equilibrium eﬀects.
The analysis rests on a nonparametric free-entry model. Potential producers make entry
choices and then compete across a possibly large number of variables; such as price and
advertising. A producer’s proﬁt depends only on the distribution of its rivals’ actions and not
1on any particular rival’s choices. This allows the transformation of a free-entry equilibrium
for a given market size into one for a larger market with the same distribution of producers’
actions. Thus, the model predicts that raising market size has no impact on the distribution
(across producers) of any observable producer choice.
Because the model embodies no parametric assumptions, its predictions can be used to
test reliably the assumption of atomistic competition using observations of producers’ actions
from a cross section of markets. The paper illustrates its application with nonparametric
regressions of restaurants’ prices, exit rates, sales, and seating capacities on market size. Of
course, the distribution of producers’ actions could diﬀer across large and small markets even
without substantial strategic interaction if the production technology and consumer tastes
systematically change with market size. The free-entry model eliminates these possibilities
by assumption, and the regression controls for them with factor prices and demographic
measures.
On average across the sample of 222 U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas, the restaurants
in larger cities have lower prices, exit less frequently, and have greater sales revenues. The
observations do not determine the contribution of increased capacity utilization to restau-
rants’ greater average sales. These ﬁndings are consistent with Campbell and Hopenhayn’s
(2005) result that restaurants and many other retail establishments in larger cities have
greater average sales and employment. Together, they favor a model of competition between
restaurants in which adding a competitor lowers producers’ markups. They also suggest that
the strategic models of entry and pricing in small markets estimated by Bresnahan and Reiss
(1990), Berry (1992), and others might enhance our understanding of competition in large
markets.
The approach to evaluating competition in large markets I advocate in this paper has
one limit worth noting. A model in which oligopolists successfully collude and keep markups
at their monopoly level but do not deter entry will replicate the scale invariance of atom-
istic competition. That is, the test has no power to reject the null in favor of the speciﬁc
2alternative of collusion with free entry. The empirical results of this paper as well as those
of Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) and Yeap (2005) indicate that this lack of power is not
a practical problem for work with U.S. data.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section sets the stage for the
analysis with an empirical examination of how restauranteurs’ decisions vary with market
size. Section 3 then provides a structural interpretation of these nonparametric results using
the general model of atomistic competition. Section 4 relates this paper’s results to those
from the relevant literature, and Section 5 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 Competition among Restaurants
To motivate this paper’s analysis, consider the U.S. Restaurant industry. The U.S. Census
questions the population of restaurants about their sales, cuisine, and pricing decisions every
ﬁve years when creating the Economic Census. These observations allow researchers to
address fundamental questions about the process of business formation, growth, and exit;
but they contain only little information about the potential for strategic interactions. This
is particularly the case for restaurants in cities, who have a great scope for diﬀerentiating
themselves by location and cuisine.
The hypothesis that the ﬁrms in this data set compete atomistically can greatly simplify
its analysis, because each ﬁrm’s actions can be cast as the outcome of a single-agent decision
problem. This simpliﬁcation could come at a high price if strategic interaction is a ﬁrst-order
feature of competition, so I desire a simple procedure that can evaluate it before proceeding
with a more complicated analysis.
Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) use a symmetric model of oligopolists with constant
marginal cost to build such a procedure. They note that oligopolists’ average sales must rise
with market size if their markups fall with additional entry, because they must recover the
same ﬁxed cost with a lower markup by selling more. Hence, modelling an industry as a
3collection of oligopolies seems promising if we see average sales rising with market size. The
two shortcomings of their procedure are its reliance on a stylized model of competition and
its exclusive focus on producers’ average sales. This paper constructs a very general model
of the null hypothesis which implies that all observable producer decisions are invariant to
market size. The following description of how U.S. restauranteurs’ actions vary with market
size provides this theoretical analysis with a concrete empirical context.
2.1 Data
For this paper, I use observations from the 1992 Census of Retail Trade for the same sample of
MSAs examined by Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005). The volume RC92-S-4, “Miscellaneous
Subjects”, reports the number of restaurants operating at any time during 1992 and at the
end of that year. These observations immediately yield one measure of the annual exit rate.
This volume also reports restaurants’ average seating capacities for each MSA, the sales of all
restaurants and of those operating at the end of the year, and the fraction of restaurants with
typical meal prices greater than or equal to $5.00. Although the Census records information
about each restaurant’s cuisine, this information is not disclosed publicly by MSA.1
From these observations, we construct four variables of interest. The ﬁrst summarizes
ﬁrms’ pricing decisions. Denote the fraction of restaurants charging a typical meal price of
$5.00 or more with S($5.00), and consider its logistic transformation
L($5.00) ≡ ln(S($5.00)/(1 − S($5.00))
This is the logarithm of the ratio of “high priced” restaurants’ share of the population to
that of their “low priced” counterparts. Figure 1 plots this variable against the demeaned
logarithm of MSA population. The observations corresponding to the smallest and largest
MSA’s (Enid, OK and Atlanta, GA) are labelled, as are the observations with extreme values
1It would be desirable to examine more recent observations. Unfortunately, the Census has not published
MSA level observations of these variables from the two most recent Economic Censuses.
4of the log relative market share. The median value of S($5.00) across the sample’s MSA’s is
0.67. The Census reports that only 13 percent of restaurants in Rocky Mount, NC charge
$5.00 or more for a meal, and it reports that 96 percent of restaurants charge $5.00 or more in
both Longview-Marshall TX and Jackson, MS. Aside from these three outliers, the minimum
and maximum values of S($5.00) are 0.32 and 0.92. The correlation between the log relative
market share and MSA population equals 0.09.
The second variable of interest measures one aspect of industry dynamics, the exit rate.
I constructed this by dividing the number of ﬁrms operating at some time of the year but
not at the end of the year by the total number of ﬁrms to operate in that year. The plot of
this against MSA log population in Figure 2 shows a negative correlation. The exit rate for
Enid, OK is very close to the maximum observed, 19 percent, while that for Atlanta, GA is
close to the median across all MSA’s, 10.3 percent. The correlation between these variables
equals −0.11.
The other two variables of interest both measure average restaurant size, restaurants’
average revenue and average seating capacity. This average revenue variable diﬀers diﬀers
from that used by Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) only because it excludes restaurants
not operating at the end of the year. Figures 3 and 4 plot these variables against MSA
population. The strong positive association between MSA population and sales revenue
documented by Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) is evident in Figure 3. Figure 4 reveals
little correlation between MSA population and average seating capacity.
2.2 Regression Results
Let Yi denote the value of one of these four measures of restaurateurs’ actions for MSA i,
and use Si and Wi to represent that MSA’s population and a vector of control variables
that includes relevant factor prices and consumer demographics. The factor prices account
for larger cities’ higher cost of commercial space and wages and lower cost of advertising
per consumer exposure. The demographic variables control for diﬀerences in preferences
5associated with income, race, and education that could shift the the nature of producers’
products and thereby indirectly inﬂuence their observable decisions. These control variables
are identical to those used in Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005). The regression of Yi on lnSi
and Wi is
Yi = m(lnSi,Wi) + Ui.
Here, m(·) is not restricted to a particular functional form.2
The curse of dimensionality makes the estimation of m(lnS,W) infeasible. However, it
is still possible to test the hypothesis that its dependence on lnS is trivial using estimates















where f (lnS,W) is the joint density function of lnS and W across markets and expectations
are taken with respect to the same joint density function. Powell, Stock, and Stoker (1989)
provide a simple instrumental variables estimator of δS and δW which converges to the true
parameter values at the parametric rate of
√
N. If market size does not directly impact
producers’ decisions, then δS = 0.
For the four measures of restaurateurs’ actions, Table 1 reports the estimated values
of δS and δW along with consistent estimates of their asymptotic standard errors. Before
estimation, the elements of W were scaled by the standard deviation of lnS, which is 0.86
in this sample. Powell, Stock, and Stoker’s estimator requires a ﬁrst-stage nonparametric
estimation of ∂f(lnS,W)/∂ lnS and ∂f(lnS,W)/∂W. The estimates reported here are
based on the tenth-order bias-reducing kernel of Bierens (1987) and use a bandwidth equal
to 2. To increase the precision of the estimates’ reports, all entries in the table and in the
text have been multiplied by 100.
2In the case where Yi = ln(Si($5.00)/(1 − Si($5.00)), this speciﬁcation for the regression function is
equivilant to assuming that Si($5.00) = em(lnSi,Wi)+Ui/(1 + em(lnSi,Wi)+Ui).
6The estimate of δS for the regression of L($5.00) equals −12.90 and is statistically sig-
nifcant at the 5 percent level. Thus, restaurants in larger markets charge lower prices given
factor costs. To gauge the magnitude of this coeﬃcient, consider an MSA with S($5.00) at
the median level of 0.67. Set all of the elements of W equal to their means and consider
increasing doubling S by one standard deviation. If we assume that ∂m(lnS,W)/∂ lnS is
constant, then such an increase in lnS decreases S($5.00) to 0.65.
The coeﬃcients on two of the factor costs, commercial rent and the retail wage, are
positive. They are both statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level, so the regression
conﬁrms the basic intuition that prices rise with factor costs. The third factor price, the cost
of purchasing 1,000 advertising exposures in a Sunday newspaper, has a negative coeﬃcient
which is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. Perhaps high advertising costs allow
producers to segment the market more eﬀectively, thereby raising prices. Regardless, the
eﬀect of advertising costs on restaurant prices merits further investigation.
The estimate of δS for the exit rate is also negative, −0.77, and statistically signiﬁcant
at the 5 percent level. This implies that doubling S decreases restaurants’ exit rate by
0.53 percentage points. As Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) document, an increase in lnS
strongly raises restaurants’ average revenue. The estimated coeﬃcient is 4.68, and it is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the one-percent level.3 The ﬁnal dependent variable is the logarithm
of average seats per restaurant. The estimated coeﬃcient is positive, 2.07, but its standard
error equals 1.99. Hence, these observations are uninformative about whether the increase in
average revenue per restaurant arises from increased capacity utilization or increased average
capacity. Nevertheless, the estimates in Table 1 clearly indicate that important decisions of
restauranteurs vary systematically with market size.
The estimates in Table 1 depend on the particular measure of market size (population)
3This estimate diﬀers greatly from that reported by Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) for the iden-
tical regression with nearly the same sample. The discrepancy between the two reﬂects an error in
Campbell and Hopenhayn’s calculations. An erratum to that paper available at http://www.nber.org/~
jrc/marketsizematters corrects that error.
7and the bandwidth choice. Table 2 examines the robustness of the estimates of δS to these
choices. Its ﬁrst column reproduces the estimates from the ﬁrst row of Table 1, and its next
two columns report alternative estimates based on measuring market size with geographic
population density and the number of housing units. Using either of these alternatives brings
the estimate of δS for the regression of L($5.00) closer to zero. It equals −8.91 and has a
p-value of 12 percent with population density, and it equals −11.93 with a p-value of 5.4
percent using housing units. All other inferences are invariant to changing the measure
of market size. The ﬁnal two columns of Table 2 report estimates based on changing the
bandwidth h from its baseline value of 2 to either 1 or 3. Changing the bandwidth moves the
estimated standard errors in the opposite direction. Otherwise, the estimates are unaﬀected.
The only inference to change relative to the baseline speciﬁcation is in the regression of
L($5.00). When h = 1, the p-value for δS equals 10.3 percent.
I have undertaken three other checks of these estimates’ robustness worth mentioning
here. First, I have estimated all of the regression equations using ordinary least squares. The
estimated coeﬃcients are similar to the nonparametric estimates of δS. The only notable
change in inference regards the coeﬃcient in the regression of L($5.00). Its estimate drops to
−9.79, and its p-value rises to 6.6 percent. Second, the Census reports the share of restaurants
charging less than $7.00 per meal. When I regress L($7.00) on lnS and W, I ﬁnd no eﬀect of
market size on prices. Apparently, the reduction of restaurant prices occurs at the market’s
“low end”. Nothing in principle prevents estimating δS using the original values of S($5.00)
as a dependent variable. When I do so, the p-value for δS rises to 5.9 percent. Finally, I
have also constructed analogues of Tables 1 and 2 for a sister industry, Refreshment Places.
In that industry, market size has no measurable eﬀect on typical meal prices, but its eﬀects
on the other three dependent variables are the same as with Restaurants.
83 A General Model of Atomistic Competition
The results of the previous section clearly conﬂict with very basic models of atomistic com-
petition. In this section, I show that the abstraction from strategic interaction is the sole
source of the conﬂict between these models and the data. The models’ other simplifying
features are not to blame. To do so, I develop the cross-market predictions of atomistic
competition in a very general model with no parametric restrictions. So that the analysis
is as broadly applicable as possible, I do not present speciﬁc conditions to guarantee the
existence and uniqueness of a free-entry equilibrium. Instead, the analysis begins with the
assumption that an equilibrium exists for a particular market size, and it then constructs an
equilibrium with the same observable distribution of producers’ actions for a larger market.
To make following the general model easier, this section begins with a particular model of
atomistic competition. It then proceeds to the general model, referring back to the speciﬁc
example to explain its moving parts.
3.1 A Speciﬁc Example
Consider a market for restaurant meals of heterogeneous quality. Production takes place in
two stages, entry and competition. In the entry stage, a large number of potential restau-
rateurs simultaneously decide whether to pay a sunk cost of i to enter the market or to
remain inactive at zero cost. After the restaurateurs commit to their entry decisions, each
restaurant receives a random endowment of quality, which can equal either the high value
qH with probability w or the low value qL with the complementary probability.
The competitive stage consists of two periods, early and late. All entrants can operate
with zero ﬁxed costs in the early period, but continuing to the late period requires paying a
continuation cost i0. Exit allows a restaurateur to avoid this cost. In both periods, consumers
randomly match with restaurants. The market is populated by S identical consumers, and
equal numbers of them match with each restaurant. Restaurateurs simultaneously post their
9prices, and consumers decide on their purchases. A consumer matched with a restaurant
charging a price p for a meal of quality q purchases d(p/q) meals. This demand function
is strictly decreasing and concave. Restaurants’ variable cost functions are identical and
feature a constant marginal cost of production, m.
A free entry equilibrium consists of a number of entrants, N, quality-contingent pricing
decisions for each of the two periods, and quality contingent exit decisions such that each
active restaurateur maximizes proﬁt, entry earns a non-negative return, and no inactive
potential entrant regrets staying out of the market. It is straightforward to show that this
model has a unique free-entry equilibrium. First, consider the restaurants’ pricing decisions,








Because d(·) is concave, there is a unique price that satisﬁes this for each quality level. It is
also straightforward to show that the optimal price increases with the restaurant’s quality.
The assumption of a constant marginal cost implies that a restaurant earns a constant
proﬁt per customer. Denote these with πL and πH for the low and high quality restau-
rants. Restaurateurs’ exit decisions depend on these proﬁts, the number of entrants, and the
cost of continuation. Denote the number of active restaurants in the late period with N0.




       
       
N if i0 ≤ (S/N) × πL,
S
πL
i0 if (S/N) × πL < i0 ≤ (S/wN) × πL,
wN if (S/wN) × πL < i0 ≤ (S/wN)πH,
S
πH
i0 if (S/wN)πH < i0.
In the ﬁrst case all restaurants can proﬁtably produce during the late period. In the second
case, low-quality restaurants exit until their continuation value equals zero. In the third
case, all low-quality restaurants exit, but all high-quality restaurants continue. In the ﬁnal
case, the continuation cost is high enough so that high-quality restaurants exit until their
10continuation value equals zero. The equilibrium exit decisions allow the deﬁnition of low
and high quality restaurants’ values at the beginning of the competitive stage, VL (S/N) and
VH (S/N). These are both strictly increasing in S/N, so there exists a unique value of N
that equates the ex-ante value of a new entrant with the entry cost.
Before proceeding to the general model, it is worth highlighting the scale invariance
of this free-entry equilibrium. Because the ex-ante value of an entrant depends only on
S/N, increasing the number of consumers raises the number of entrants proportionately.
Restaurants’ optimal prices depend on neither S nor N, while increasing both S and N
raises N0 by the same proportion and leaves the exit rate, 1 − N0/N, unchanged. Hence,
increasing the number of consumers in the market leaves the distributions of all observable
producer decisions unchanged.
This speciﬁc example is far too stylized for empirical work, but suppose for the moment
that it generated the MSA-level observations of restauranteurs’ decisions used in Section
2. If restaurateurs’ marginal costs and consumers’ demand curves depend on a vector of
market-speciﬁc variables like the factor prices and demographics in W, then regressions of
restaurants’ exit rate and of the fraction of restaurants with “high” prices on this vector and
lnS would detect no dependence of these market-level summaries of producer actions on
market size. In this sense, the speciﬁc example yields a testable prediction for cross-market
comparisons of producer actions. The fact that the results in Section 2 refute this prediction
implies that this very simple model could not have generated the data in hand. The analysis
of the general model demonstrates that the conﬂict arises from the assumption of atomistic
competition rather than one of the example’s other simplifying assumptions.
3.2 The General Model
Like the speciﬁc example, the general model consists of two stages, entry and comptition.
In the ﬁrst stage, a large number of potential entrants simultaneously make their entry
decisions. At the same time, entering producers make their product choices. The product
11choice of a particular entrant is x, and this lies in the set of all possible choices, X ⊂ Rk,
where k < ∞. The number of producers that made choice x is F (x) ∈ N, which I call the
industry’s entry proﬁle. The example did not make restaurateurs’ product choices explicit,
but we can easily assume that they choose product addresses in R and that all consumers
match in equal numbers with all oﬀered products.
In the second stage, producers compete to sell their products to the market’s S consumers.
Producers simultaneously choose actions, a ∈ A ⊂ Rl, where l < ∞. Producers’ proﬁts
depend on these choices and on realization of a vector of aggregate shocks, Z, which occurs
before producers choose actions. An action proﬁle is a function A(x;Z,F) → A. If F (x0) >
0, then A(x0;Z,F) gives the action of a producer that chose x0 at entry. In the example,
a represents a restaurants’ early and late prices and its continuation probability and Z
determines restaurants’ qualities.4
For simplicity, we assume that if two or more entrants chose x, they both choose the
same post entry action.5 The total revenues of a producer at x0 that chooses the action a0
when all other producers’ use the action proﬁle A(x;Z,F) and the entry proﬁle is F (x) are
S × r(a0,x0;A,Z,F). Here, S denotes the number of consumers and r(·) is the producer’s
average revenue per consumer, which does not directly depend on S. That producer’s costs
are c(a0,x0;A,Z,F,S). Because c(·) includes ﬁxed costs and marginal cost might not be
constant, it need not depend on S linearly.
4The speciﬁc example relies on idiosyncratic shocks to entrants’ qualities. To use the general model’s
aggregate shocks to represent idiosyncratic shocks, assume that Z is a uniformly distributed location on
the unit-circumference circle and that a restaurant has high quality if the clockwise distance between x/N
(interpreted as a location on this circle) and Z is less than w. A potential entrant is indiﬀerent across all
locations on [0,N) if entrants uniformly distribute themselves on this interval, so such a uniform distribution
is an equilibrium outcome that generates the same distribution of high and low quality as in the example.
5As in the speciﬁc example, an element of a can represent a mixed strategy over a discrete and ﬁnite
set of actions; and the revenues and costs speciﬁed below can be reinterpreted as expected values. Hence
this assumption allows for mixed strategies. However, it does remove asymmetric Nash equilibria from
consideration.
12The expected post entry proﬁt to a producer choosing x0 at entry when it and its com-
petitors follow the action proﬁle A(x;Z,F) are
π (x





Here, the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of Z. This expectation exists
under the assumption that that r(·) and c(·) are uniformly bounded functions of a and Z.
For the example, denote the prices charged by a restaurant and the probability that it
produces in the late period with a1, a2, and a3 The revenue and cost functions in the case




× d(a1/q) + a3 ×
a2
N0 × d(a2/q), and
c(·) = i + m ×
S
N
d(a1/q) + a3 ×

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In these expressions, the restaurant’s quality q is the function of Z and x described in
Footnote 4.
Deﬁne a strategy proﬁle to be an action proﬁle A(x;Z,F) paired with an entry proﬁle
F (x) and denote it with (A,F). With this notation in place, the deﬁnition of a free-entry
equilibrium may proceed.6
Deﬁnition A strategy proﬁle (A?,F ?) is a free-entry equilibrium for a market with S
consumers if it satisﬁes the following conditions.












6Conventional notation for a dynamic game takes a set of players with names, a strategy space, and payoﬀ
functions as primitives. The application of that approach to this model would specify the set of players as an
unbounded set of potential entrants with names in Rk, the strategy space as X ×{A(x;Z,F) ∈ A}, and the
payoﬀs as proﬁt deﬁned above. Because F (x) and Z directly index all relevant subgames, working directly
with the strategy proﬁle as deﬁned here simpliﬁes the model’s exposition.
13(b) For all x0 ∈ X, π (x0;A,F ? + I {x = x0},S) ≤ 0.




?,S) ≥ π (x
00;A
?,F
? + I {x = x
00} − I {x = x
0},S)
Condition (a) of this deﬁnition ensures that the action proﬁle A? (x;Z,F) forms a Nash
equilibrium for all subgames following the entry stage. Condition (b) requires that no further
entry is proﬁtable, and condition (c) states that each active producer’s entry decision and
choice of x is optimal given all other potential entrants’ decisions. Together, the deﬁnition’s
three conditions are equivalent to requiring the strategy proﬁle (A?,F ?) to correspond to a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with pure strategies in the entry stage.
3.3 Atomistic Competition
At this level of generality, the framework encompasses many models. To specialize it and
thereby derive the implications of atomistic competition, we impose the following two con-
ditions. The ﬁrst condition allows for only trivial strategic interactions between producers
when no two of them occupy the same location in X, and the second ensures that no such
“local oligopolies” will arise in a free-entry equilibrium. Henceforth, I assume that X is a
Borel measurable set with positive measure, denote the set of its Borel measurable subsets
with M, and use µ(M) to denote the Borel measure of M ∈ M.
Assumption A1 (Atomistic Competition) Let (A,F) be a strategy proﬁle with F (x) ≤
1 and deﬁne M = {x|F(x) = 1}. If F(x) is Borel-measurable, µ(M) > 0, A(x;Z,F 0) is
Borel-measurable given any shock realization Z and Borel-measurable entry proﬁle F 0, and
F(x0) = 1, then the revenues of the producer at x0 choosing the action a0 satisfy
S × r(a
0,x
0;A,Z,F) = S × ρ(a
0,x
0;G(A,Z,F),Z,NF),







I {A(x;Z,F) ≤ a
0} × F(x)dµ(x).
14Two aspects of Assumption A1 capture the idea that producers compete atomistically.
First, a producer’s revenues only depend on its own choices, aggregate shocks, the mass
of competing producers, and the empirical distribution of their actions. Second, any one
producer has measure zero when computing this distribution, so changing a single producer’s
conduct alters no other producer’s revenue. The example revenue function above satisﬁes
Assumption A1, because each producer’s proﬁt depends on its rivals actions only through
S/N and S/N0. A ﬁnite-horizon version of Hopenhayn’s (1992) model of perfect competition
also satisﬁes Assumption A1. In any particular industry, the number of producers is obviously
countable and not continuous. Models of atomistic competition are of empirical interest
because their predictions might ﬁt the data well in spite of the false simplifying assumption
of a continuum of producers.
Assumption A2 (Product Diﬀerentiation) If F (x0) ≥ 2 and A satisﬁes condition (a)
of the deﬁnition of a free-entry equilibrium, then π (x0;A,F,S) < 0.
Assumption A2 states that competition between producers of identical products is tough
enough to guarantee that no more than one producer will occupy any location in X. Thus,
the observed market structure will not contain any “local” oligopolies. The speciﬁc example
satisﬁes this assumption. Any model in which ﬁrms’ producing exactly the same product
act as Bertrand competitors will satisfy Assumption A2.7
3.4 Intrinsic Scale Eﬀects
Thus far, the model’s speciﬁcation does not rule out direct eﬀects of the scale of the market,
measured with either S or NF, on producers’ revenues or costs. For example, the product
space might be limited so that entry cannot continue indeﬁnitely. The market shares of
7A model with price-taking producers of a homogeneous good, such as Hopenhayn’s (1992), could accom-
modate this assumption by deﬁning a trivial product placement choice x on the real line and assuming that
the cost of entry at a given “location” increases steeply with the number of entrants there.
15producers with particular choices of x might be more or less sensitive to the size of the
market, or directly raising S could systematically reduce costs and so encourage entry and
production. For all of these reasons, the distribution of producers’ decisions across large and
small markets could diﬀer. The following three conditions eliminate them as a theoretical
possibility.
Assumption S1 (Invariance of Market Shares) The per consumer revenue function ρ(·)
is homogeneous of degree -1 in NF.
This assumption states that doubling the number of producers while holding the distribution
of their actions ﬁxed cuts each producer’s revenue in half. In the example, it follows from the
uniform random matching of consumers with ﬁrms. This assumption is closely related to the
independence of irrelevant alternatives: Adding a producer to a market does not change the
relative market shares of any two incumbents. It also rules out Sutton’s (1991) assumption
that the winner of a pre-entry investment game obtains a minimum share of market sales,
so his analysis of natural oligopolies does not apply here. However, Assumption S1 does
not itself limit the cross-price elasticities of ﬁrms’ products and thereby make the market
less “competitive.” For example, Salop’s (1979) model of competition between spatially
diﬀerentiated oligopolists on the unit circle satisﬁes it: If we double the number of evenly
spaced ﬁrms while holding their prices constant, each ﬁrm sells to half as many consumers.8
Assumption S2 (No Productive Spillovers) For any entry choice x0 ∈ X,action a0 ∈


















8Of course, the circle model does not satisfy Assumption A1, so Assumption S1 only applies to an
appropriately deﬁned per consumer revenue function.
16Assumption S2 implies that is impossible to hold a producer’s choices of x and a ﬁxed,
change its competitive environment, and lower that producer’s costs without simultaneously
lowering its revenues. Any model in which producers’ costs depend only on their own output
satisﬁes this assumption. If the market faces an upward sloping supply curve for some input,
as in some versions of Hopenhayn’s (1992) model, then this assumption would be violated.
The simple aﬃne technology of the example obviously satisﬁes Assumption S2.
Assumption S3 (Distinct Observationally Equivalent Strategy Proﬁles) For any mar-
ket size S and strategy proﬁle (A,F) such that F(x) ≤ 1 for all x ∈ X, there exists a contin-
uous, one to one, and onto function g : X → X such that if we deﬁne F T (x) ≡ F (g−1 (x)),
and AT(x;Z,F T) = A(g−1(x),Z,F) then
(a) ∀x ∈ X, F (x) + F T (x) ≤ 1;
(b) if F (x0) > 0, then
S × r(a
0,x



















(c) ∀M ∈ M, µ(g−1 (M)) = µ(M).
In many models of competition with product diﬀerentiation, it is possible to rearrange
producers’ locations in X, hold their actions ﬁxed, and leave their payoﬀs unchanged. Con-
sider two examples of such a rearrangement, moving all producers a short distance to the
right in Salop’s (1979) circle model and changing the particular products chosen by entrants
in Dixit and Stiglitz’s (1978) model of Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. In both
cases, the rearrangement leaves the game played after product placement unaltered. In As-
sumption S3, conditions (a) and (b) require such a rearrangement to be possible for any given
strategy proﬁle. In this section’s simple example, X is an inﬁnite set of all possible products
17without any spatial structure or asymmetries in demand or cost, so such a rearrangement is
possible. Condition (c) requires g (x) to be measure preserving, so that the rearrangement
does not alter the mass of producers. Overall, Assumption S3 asserts that no location in X
has payoﬀ-relevant characteristics that are unique.
3.5 Equilibrium
The following two conditions ensure that potential entrants’ expectations about post-entry
competition can be well-deﬁned and that a free-entry equilibrium exists.
Assumption E1 (Existence of Nash Equilibrium) For any market size S, there exists
a strategy proﬁle A(x,Z,F) that satisﬁes condition (a) of the deﬁnition of a free-entry equi-
librium.
Assumption E2 (Existence of a Measurable Free Entry Equilibrium) There exists
a market size S0 > 0 with a corresponding free-entry equilibrium (A0,F0) such that
(a) F0(x) and A0(x;Z,F0) are Borel measurable functions of x for any Z, and
(b) A0(x0;Z,F) = A0(x0;Z,F0) if F(x0) = F0(x0) = 1 and F(x) = F0(x) almost every-
where.
To the extent that nearly all existing models of entry and competition have well-deﬁned
equilibria, assumption E1 and part (a) of Assumption E2 can be viewed as regularity con-
ditions. Part (b) of Assumption E2 eliminates the possibility that a positive measure of
ﬁrms respond to deviations from the equilibrium by a single (measure zero) ﬁrm. That is,
there is no producer whose actions act as a pure coordination device for the others. Both
assumptions are clearly true for the speciﬁc example.
183.6 Market Size and Producers’ Actions
The above assumptions place suﬃcient structure on the model to imply the following obser-
vational implication of atomistic competition.
Proposition If S=2j×S0, where j is a non-negative integer and S0 is deﬁned in Assump-
tion E2, then there exists a free entry equilibrium (Aj,Fj) such that
G(Aj,Z,Fj) = G(A0,Z,F0)
where (A0,F0) is the free-entry equilibrium assumed to exist in Assumption E2.
The appendix presents the proposition’s proof. Here, I only outline the argument. Con-
sider the free-entry equilibrium (A0,F0) for S0. We know from Assumption S3 that there is






. Now consider a market
with S1 = 2×S0 and entry proﬁle, F0 +F T
0 . If all producers duplicate the actions they take
in the smaller market, then the empirical c.d.f. of producers actions remains unchanged, so
Assumptions A1, S1, and S2 imply that each producer’s proﬁt maximizing action remains
unchanged. That is, the action proﬁle that duplicates producers’ actions is a Nash equi-
librium proﬁle for this larger market size and entry proﬁle. Each producer’s proﬁts remain
unchanged, and the proﬁts from producing in an unoccupied location in X are identical to
their value in the original free entry equilibrium with the smaller market size, so conditions
(b) and (c) of the deﬁnition are satisﬁed. Each producer’s actions equal those from the
original equilibrium, so their empirical distributions are also unchanged as the proposition
asserts.9
9The proposition’s focus on doubling market size can easily be changed if the assertion that g(x) is
measure preserving in Assumption S3 is replaced with the assumption that for any t > 1, there exists a
gt(x) satisfying the assumption’s other conditions and which satisﬁes µ(g
−1
t (M)) = t × µ(M). With this, a
parallel argument establishes that a free-entry equilibrium that replicates producers’ decisions exists for any
market size greater than S0.
19The proposition illustrates that the invariance of producers’ decisions to the market’s
size in the speciﬁc example extends well beyond its particular assumptions. All of the
assumptions excepting A1 are regularity conditions, so I interpret the fact that market size
does inﬂuence restauranteurs’ observable decisions as a rejection of atomistic competition.
3.7 Extensions
The general model is restrictive in two ways that are worth noting. First, it has no role for
actions that are taken prior to the realization of Z that do not directly diﬀerentiate ﬁrms’
products, such as investments that increase the likelihood of having a high quality restaurant.
Adding such pre competition actions to the general model increases its notational burden
but does not alter its scale invariance. Second, the use of the Borel integral to form the
c.d.f. of producers’ actions in Assumption A1 restricts product placement decisions to be
continuous choices. Scale invariance requires some continuous product placement decision
to diﬀerentiate ﬁrms’ products, but it does not require all product placement decisions to be
continuous. Extending the general model to allow for discrete dimensions of ﬁrms’ product
placement decisions is straightforward.
3.8 Atomistic and Monopolistic Competition
Before concluding, it is helpful to clarify the relationship between what I have labelled
“atomistic competition” with the large theoretical literature on monopolistic competition.
For some authors, “monopolistic competition” refers to all imperfect competition among
a large number of producers. Models that prominently feature strategic interaction, such
as Salop’s (1979) model of spatial competition, then go by the label of “Hotelling-style”
monopolistic competition. Models with only trivial strategic considerations, such as Spence’s
(1976) are called “Chamberlin-style”.
Hart (1985) and Wolinsky (1986) propose a more exclusive deﬁnition of “monopolistic
competition” based on four criteria.
20(1) there are many ﬁrms producing diﬀerentiated commodities; (2) each ﬁrm is
negligible in the sense that it can ignore its impact on, and hence reactions from,
other ﬁrms; (3) each ﬁrm faces a downward sloping demand curve and hence the
equilibrium price exceeds marginal cost; (4) free entry results in zero-proﬁt of
operating ﬁrms (or, at least, of marginal ﬁrms).10
These clearly correspond to what others call Chamberlin-style monopolistic competition.
Hart and Wolinsky’s ﬁrst two criteria correspond to Assumptions A2 and A1, and the fourth
criterion is implicit in the deﬁnition of a free-entry equilibrium. The deﬁnition of atomistic
competition does not require ﬁrms to face downward sloping demand curves, but it clearly
allows for that possibility. Hence, models of monopolistic competition (in the sense of Hart
and Wolinsky) can usually be written without economically substantial changes to satisfy the
assumptions this paper places on atomistic competition. However, the deﬁnition of atomistic
competition is broad enough to also encompass models without market power.
4 Related Literature
Structure-conduct-performance studies gave rise to many examinations of competitive out-
comes’ dependence on market size. One strand of this literature uses the empirical relation-
ship between market size and the number of competitors to infer how adding competition
lowers markups. If doubling market size leads to a less than proportional increase in the
number of producers, either per-consumer proﬁts fall with entry or incumbents raise en-
trants’ ﬁxed costs. Bresnahan and Reiss (1989) apply this approach to concentrated retail
automobile markets in isolated towns. Berry and Waldfogel (2003) examine the inﬂuence of
market size on the number of competitors in a slightly broader sample of MSAs than that
used in this paper, and they ﬁnd that the number of restaurants increases less than propor-
tionally with MSA population.11 The proof of this paper’s proposition makes it clear that
10Wolinsky (1986), page 493.
11See the third and fourth columns of their Table 3.
21the number of producers in atomistically competitive markets is proportional to the number
of consumers, so Berry and Waldfogel’s ﬁnding reinforces this paper’s empirical conclusion.12
This paper’s proposition does not stress the relationship between market size and the
number of ﬁrms under atomistic competition, because a ﬁnding that doubling market size
less than doubles the number of ﬁrms could arise solely from measurement error in market
size. Measurement error could make the rejection of this paper’s exclusion restrictions less
likely when they are false, but it does not lead directly to their rejection when they are
true. In this sense, a test of atomistic competition based on the relationship between noisily
measured market size and measures of producer actions is conservative.13
This paper derives testable predictions of a free-entry model without the use of parametric
assumptions. In this respect, Sutton’s (1991) analysis of models with endogenous sunk costs
precedes it. He considers a model of competition in which entrants compete with sunk
investments in product quality. The ﬁrm with the greatest investment earns a guaranteed
minimum market share, regardless of the number of other producers. Sutton shows that
these features together imply a nonparametric upper bound on the number of entrants, and
he demonstrates that cross-country data from several advertising-intensive food processing
industries satisfy this bound. As the number of consumers grows, the number of entrants
remains bounded from above. In this sense, industries that satisfy his model’s assumptions
are natural oligopolies. As noted above in Subsection 3.7, it is notationally burdensome
but straightforward to add pre-entry investments in quality to this paper’s model. This
12Berry and Waldfogel’s ﬁnding also manifests itself in the observations used in the present paper. The
estimate of δs from a nonparametric regression of the number of restaurants’ logarithm on population’s
logarithm and the other control variables listed in Table 1 using Campbell and Hopenhayn’s (2005) sample
of MSAs equals 0.93, and this is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one.
13Bresnahan and Reiss (1989) can measure market size accurately because they carefully chose their
sample towns. This strategy becomes infeasible when considering competition in large markets in which the
deﬁnition of the market and industry are themselves somewhat subjective, so prudence requires accounting
for possible measurement error.
22extension leaves the model’s nonparametric testable implications unaltered. In particular,
the number of producers grows linearly with market size. The contrast between that result
and Sutton’s highlights the role of endogenous sunk costs in his results: They are necessary
but not suﬃcient for an industry to be a natural oligopoly. Hence, the simple observation
that an industry’s producers incur endogenous sunk costs does not imply that its ﬁrms
are oligopolists. However, tests of the exclusion restrictions from atomistic competition do
provide information about the nature of competition.
The analysis of the exit of restaurants places this paper in another vast literature which
examines the rate of producer turnover and the reallocation of resources between produc-
ers. These papers have focused on diﬀerences in ﬁrm growth and survival across the life
cycle (as in Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989)) and on the interaction of resource re-
allocation with the business cycle (as in Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996), Campbell
(1998), and Campbell and Lapham (2004)). Analysis of how the pace of resource reallo-
cation varies with local market conditions, similar to that in this paper, is much scarcer.
Syverson (2004) shows that ready-mixed concrete producers serving geographically concen-
trated markets have higher average productivity and less productivity dispersion than their
counterparts is more sparsely populated areas, and he interprets this as the result of more
intense selection in highly competitive markets. Similarly, Asplund and Nocke (2006) ﬁnd
that Swedish hairstylists are younger in larger markets. This paper ﬁnds the opposite rela-
tionship between market size and exit for U.S. restaurants. In light of this paper’s theoretical
results, this observation suggests that strategic interaction substantially inﬂuences the rate
of restaurant turnover. However, Syverson’s and Asplund and Nocke’s results indicate that
much more work is required before a robust stylized fact about the relationship between
industry concentration and reallocation emerges.
235 Conclusion
The relative simplicity of atomistic competition models makes them a tempting ﬁrst choice
for the empirical study of competition in large markets. This paper presents their nonpara-
metric implications which can be used to examine their suitability before proceeding with
a more involved investigation.14 The application of these results to observations of U.S.
restaurants’ prices, exit rates, sales, and seating capacity indicates that atomistic competi-
tion cannot explain how restauranteurs’ key choices depend on market size. Relatedly, Yeap
(2005) documents that this increase in average size reﬂects only the decisions of ﬁrms owning
two or more restaurants. Taken together these ﬁndings indicate that better understanding of
competition among restaurants in large markets requires confronting restaurateurs’ strate-
gic behavior. Toivanen and Waterson (2005) take an important step in this direction by
empirically modelling entry decisions into well deﬁned duopoly fast-food markets. Extend-
ing such an analysis to large samples of restaurants without high-quality information about
market deﬁnitions and strategic interactions is the subject of my current research with Jaap
Abbring.
14For example, Abbring and Campbell (2004) apply this papers’ results to test the assumption of atomistic
competition in their structural model of new Texas bars’ growth and exit decisions.
24Proof of the Proposition
Clearly, the proposition is true for j = 0. We now wish to show that it is true for j = 1.
The proposition can then be demonstrated recursively for greater values of j.
Let g (x) be the function assumed to exist in Assumption S3. Deﬁne the entry proﬁle
F1 (x) = F0 (x) + F T
0 (x), where the latter entry proﬁle is deﬁned as in the statement of
Assumption S3. From Assumption A2 and the deﬁnition of a free-entry equilibrium, we know
that F0 (x) ∈ {0,1}. Therefore, condition (a) of Assumption S3 ensures that F1 (x) ∈ {0,1}.
We know from Assumption E1 that there exists an action proﬁle A(x;Z,F) that satisﬁes
condition (a) of a free-entry equilibrium’s deﬁnition for S1 = 2 × S0. We now wish to
use this and A0 (x;Z,F) to construct an action proﬁle that forms a candidate free-entry
equilibrium when paired with F1. For any entry proﬁle F (x) such that either F (x0) ≥ 2 for
some x0 ∈ X or {x|F (x) 6= F1 (x)} is either not measurable or has positive measure, deﬁne
A1 (x;Z,F) = A(x;Z,F).
For any entry proﬁle F (x) ∈ {0,1} for which F (x) = F1 (x) almost everywhere, there
exists two measurable sets Cp and Cm with µ(Cp) = µ(Cm) = 0 and F (x) = F1 (x) +
I {x ∈ Cp}−I {x ∈ Cm}. Deﬁne F0 (Cp)(x) = F0 (x)+I {x ∈ Cp}. If F (x) = 1, then either
F0 (Cp)(x) = 1 or F T






A0 (x;Z,F0 (Cp)) if F0 (Cp)(x) = 1,
A0 (g−1 (x);Z,F0 (Cp)) otherwise.
Because the composition of Borel measurable functions is itself Borel measurable, A1 (x;Z,F)
is a Borel measurable function of x.
The next step is to show that (A1,F1) is a free-entry equilibrium. To do so, consider the
deﬁnition’s three conditions in turn.
25Condition (a)
Note that by construction A1 (x;Z,F) satisﬁes the inequality in condition (a) of a free-entry
equilibrium’s deﬁnition if F (x) ≥ 2 for some x ∈ X or {x|F (x) 6= F1 (x)} is either not









































The ﬁrst equality holds because F1 and F0 (Cp)+F 0
0 (Cp) diﬀer by a set of measure zero, and
the last equality follows from Proposition 1 in Chapter 15 of Royden (1988).
With this and Assumptions A1 and S1, we can conclude that if F0 (Cp)(x) = 1, then for



















The action A0 (x0;Z,F0 (Cp)) = A1 (x0;Z,F) maximizes the right-hand side of (A.1), so it
must also maximize its left-hand side.
Alternatively, if F 0
0 (Cp)(x) = 1, then we can construct a parallel argument to show that
A1 (x0,F) maximizes the ﬁrm’s proﬁt. Thus A1 (x,F) satisﬁes condition (a) of a free-entry
equilibrium’s deﬁnition.
Condition (b)
Next, consider condition (b) of the deﬁnition. Extending the notation above, denote F1 (x)+
I {x = x0} with F1 ({x0})(x), If F1 (x0) = 1, then the deﬁnition of A1 and Assumptions
26A2 and E1 imply that π (x0;A1,F1 ({x0}),S) ≤ 0. Next, note that if F1 (x0) = 0, then we
know from above that G(A1,Z,F1 ({x0}))(a) = G(A0,Z,F0 ({x0}))(a), and that NF1({x0}) =
2 × NF0({x0}). Therefore, Assumptions A1, S1, and S2 and the deﬁnition of a free-entry
equilibrium imply that π (x0;A1,F1 ({x0}),S) ≤ 0 in this case as well. Hence, condition (b)
of the deﬁnition is satisﬁed.
Condition (c)
Finally, consider condition (c) of a free-entry equilibrium’s deﬁnition. Because G(A1,Z,F1)(a) =
G(A0,Z,F0)(a) and NF1 = 2 × NF0, we know that if F0 (x0) = 1 then π (x0;A1,F1,S1) =
π (x0;A0,F0,S0) ≥ 0 Furthermore, conditions (b) and (c) of Assumption S3 imply that this
inequality also applies if F T
0 (x0) = 1. Therefore, the ﬁrst inequality in condition (c) of the
deﬁnition holds good.
The second inequality in this condition holds trivially from Assumption A2 and the
deﬁnition of A1 if F1 (x00) = 1. Suppose instead that F1 (x00) = 0 and F1 (x0) = 1. We know
that F1 (x) + I {x = x00} − I {x = x0} = F1 (x) + I {x = x00} almost everywhere. From this
and the fact that we have already veriﬁed condition (b) of an equilibrium’s deﬁnition, we
conclude that
π (x
00;A1,F1 + I {x = x
00} − I {x = x
0},S1) ≤ 0.
Thus, the second inequality of condition (c) holds and (A1,F1) is a free-entry equilibrium.
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29Table 1: Nonparametric Regression Estimates(i,ii,iii)
Log Average
L($5.00) Exit Rate Revenue Seats per Restaurant
Population -12.90?? -0.77?? 4.68??? 2.07
(6.13) (0.32) (1.76) (1.99)
Commercial Rent 11.16? -0.29 1.66 -2.23
(6.29) (0.30) (1.53) (1.89)
Retail Wage 17.37?? 0.69?? -0.49 -2.56
(7.12) (0.35) (1.56) (2.18)
Advertising Cost -9.00? -0.30 -1.43 -0.35
(5.47) (0.27) (1.65) (1.95)
Income -1.67 -0.55? 6.17??? 4.90??
(7.03) (0.33) (1.63) (2.39)
Percent Black 20.89??? 0.62?? 0.90 -3.95?
(5.91) (0.26) (1.31) (2.16)
Percent College 19.70??? -0.09 8.48??? 2.50
(6.22) (0.33) (1.28) (1.83)
Vehicle Ownership -2.41 -0.57?? -1.16 1.38
(5.08) (0.28) (1.58) (2.00)
Notes: (i) The table reports estimates of density-weighted average derivatives from the
regressions of the indicated variables on the regressors listed in the ﬁrst column. Asymptotic
standard errors appear below each estimate in parentheses. The superscripts ?, ??, and ???
indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels (ii) In the table, L($5.00)
refers to the logistic transformation of the fraction of restaurants in an MSA with typical
meal prices greater than or equal to $5.00. (iii) All estimates have been multiplied by 100.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Logistic Transformation of the Share of Establishments with High Meal Prices(i)
Note: The ﬁgure plots the logistic transofrmation of the share of establishments with typical
meal prices exceeding $5.00 against the demeaned logarithm of MSA population.




Figure 2: Restaurants’ Annual Exit Rate in Percentage Points




Figure 3: Logarithm of Restaurants’ Average Revenue




Figure 4: Logarithm of Average Seats per Restaurant
35